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infants' physical knowledge has brought to light an 
unexpected discrepancy. When shown that an object 
stands in the path of a rotating screen, infants are 
surprised to see the screen rotate until it lies flat 
against the floor of the apparatus. However, when 
shown that a cloth cover lies fiat against the floor of 
an apparatus, infants are not surprised to see an 
object retrieved from beneath the cover.
The present study examines these apparently 
discordant results. Two groups of 6.5-month-old 
infants were tested. The infants in the occlusion 
condition saw a possible and an impossible test event. 
At the start of each event, a screen lay flat against 
the floor of an apparatus, toward the infants, and a 
large toy clown stood behind the screen. In the 
possible event, the screen was rotated 112-degrees 
until it reached the occluded clown. In the impossible 
event, the screen was rotated 180-degrees until it lay 
flat against the floor of the apparatus, as though the 
clown were no longer behind it. The infants in the 
disocclusioncondition saw the same two test events in 
reverse. Thus, in the possible event, the screen first
stood at a 112-degree angle and was rotated forward to 
reveal the clown behind it. Similarly, in the 
impossible event, the screen first lay flat against the 
floor of the apparatus, away from the infants, and was 
again rotated forward to reveal the clown.
The infants m  the occlusion condition looked 
reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible 
event, suggesting that they expected the screen to stop 
against the occluded clown and were surprised when it 
did not. In contrast, the infants in the disocclusion 
condition tended to look equally at the two test 
events.
The present results thus provide direct evidence 
of a discrepancy between 6 .5-month-old infants' 
reasoning about occlusion and disocclusion events 
involving solidity violations. The proposed 
explanation for this discrepancy focuses on the 
concrete unidirectional nature of infants' 
representations of physical events.
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& long standing concern of cognitive psychology 
has been to describe children's and adults' knowledge 
of objects in the world. The object concept refers to 
beliefs about properties and behaviors of occluded 
objects; specifically, adults believe that when one 
object is occluded by another the hidden object exists 
independently of our actions upon it, retains its 
physical and spatial properties, and is still governed 
by physical laws of the world. These assumptions may 
seem so basic as to need no further consideration, but 
the importance of such knowledge is seen when one 
considers what it would be like to live in this world 
without such a knowledge of an object's permanence and 
its characteristics.
Piaget (1954; claimed that the object concept is 
not an innate property out develops in stages. His 
research was the first to examine whether infants hold 
the same knowledge about occluded objects as adults do. 
Using manual search tasks, Piaget investigated whether 
infants believe an object still exists once occluded by 
another object. These experiments led him to believe 
that infants' object concept develops in six stages and 
is not complete until two years of age.
This theory sparked much research m  the area of
infant cognition, for this idea of object permanence 
seems to be a basis for cognitive development in 
infancy. A true representation of the physical world 
is impossible without the belief that objects continue 
to exist when occluded. Thus much research has been 
dedicated to investigating Piaget's theory of the 
development of infants* object concept (see Bremner, 
1985; Harris, 1989; Schuberth, 1983; Spelke, 1988; and 
Wellman, Cross, & Bartsch, 1987, for reviews).
Most of Piaget's findings have been replicated, 
and many researchers have reviewed his theory favorably 
(see Gratch, 1975, 1976 for reviews). But with 
alternative testing methods, there is now evidence that 
calls for a new interpretation of Piaget's findings. 
Paradigms employing searches m  the dark (Bower & 
Wishart, 1972; Clifton, Rochat, Litovsky & Perris,
1991; Hood & Willatts, 1986) and visual tasks 
(Baillargeon, 1987a; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991; 
Bailiargeon & Graber, 1987; Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos 
& Black, 1990; Baillargeon, Spelke & Wasserman, 1985; 
Bower, 1971, 1974; Spelke, 1988) have provided evidence 
that infants as young as 3.5 months show knowledge of 
object permanence. Many of the latter tasks use a 
violation-of-expectation paradigm. In this paradigm
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infants are shown two events: a possible everu and an 
impossible event. The possible event shows the 
.manipulation of objects m  a way consistent with 
physical laws. The impossible event violates these 
expectations. If infants are surprised by something 
they see/ they will generally look longer at the event; 
therefore, it is assumed m  this paradigm that if 
infants look reliably longer at the impossible as 
compared with the possible event, then they find the 
former event surprising. It is largely data obtained 
with this methodology that have led to a new 
interpretation of Piaget's findings.
In this review of the literature on object 
concept, especially object permanence, Piaget's theory 
will first be discussed followed by reviews of more 
recent research including work by Clifton et ai. (1991) 
and Hood and Willatts (1986) using search-m-the-dark 
tasks, and work by Bower (1967, 1972, 1974; Bower et 
al., 1971; Bower & Wishart, 1972), and Baillargeon 
(1987a; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991; Baillargeon &
Graber, 1987; Baillargeon et al., 1990; Baillargeon et 
al., 1985), using visual tasks. It will be shown how 
these new methodologies have provided evidence that 
drastically changes the view of what infants understand
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about objects in the world. Finally, a paradox that
has developed concerning two tasks that, on one level,
seem to be measuring an identical concept will be
considered and different possible explanations
discussed,
eiagars TfmglY
■Piagetrs 11954) theory provides six stages of 
development through which an infant passes in achieving 
a full-blown object concept. In the first throt stages 
<0-9 months) infants have no conception of object 
permanence. An object that is occluded simply ceases 
to exist and when it is brought back into view again, 
it comes bacx into existence. Piaget substantiated 
this idea with evidence from search tasks; when an 
object was occluded in an infant's view, an infant leas 
than nine months old did not attempt to search for the 
object. During the fourth stage (9-12 months) the 
infants will search manually for an occluded object, 
but when given a choice of locations to search, the 
infant will not always search the correct, location even 
though they watched the experimenter hide the object. 
Specifically, when an object was hidden in one location 
(A) for one or more trials, the infant was able to find 
the object. But if; the object was then hidden at a
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second location (B), the infant searched again at the A 
location. This is termed the AB error. This error is 
not seen in stage five infants (12-18 months). It is 
in this stage, according to Piaget, that, infants are 
not only able to realise that the object continues to 
exist when hidden, but also to understand that, the 
occluded abject resides m  the location where last 
seen. The sixth stage (18-24 months) marks the 
beginning of symbolic representation; that is, infants 
are then able to infer an occluded object's location 
even though they did riot see the occluding event , It 
is at this point that Piaget believes infants 
understand that objects retain their identity and 
characteriseics even when occluded and that occluded 
objects are subject to physical laws.
Piaget makes many important claims about infants' 
ability to understand objects m  their world.
According to his theory, it is not antii nine months of 
age that infants understand that occluded objects 
continue to exist; this is based on hi 3 findings that 
younger infants did not search for an occluded object, 
suggesting to Piaget that they did riot believe the 
object still existed. Piaget believes the willingness 
to search for occluded objects marks the emergence of
object permanence because xt suggests they do believe 
the occluded object still exists.
The next of Piaget's assertions is that infants do 
not believe that objects occupy objective locations in 
space. He bases this on the AB error findings. Thus 
although the infants do show some knowledge of object 
permanence, this knowledge is not yet complete. Piaget 
attributes these errors tc egocentrism because infants 
still believe that their actions on an occluded object 
have some control over the emergence of the object. 
Specifically, when an object disappears at B, the 
infant searched at A because this action was able to 
reproduce the object m  the past trials. By stage 
five, however, infants overcome this error and search 
the correct locations. Piaget considered this a result 
of the infants's understanding that an object resides 
m  locations based on the object's displacement m  the 
world and not the infant's own actions upon it.
Piaget's final claim is that it is not until 
eighteen months that infants can infer the location of 
an occluded object. The invisible displacement tasks 
that Piaget used involved hiding an object in a 
container in the infant's sight and then secretly 
leaving the object behind one of several screens.
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According to Piaget's findings, stage five infants 
searched the container but made no further attempt to 
locate the object once it was not found there. Stage 
six infants on the other hand searched behind the 
screens after realizing the object was no longer m  the 
container. Piaget believes stage six infants do this 
because they are able to infer that the object was 
displaced behind one of the screens. Having attained 
this representational ability, Piaget considers the 
infant equipped with the same knowledge that adults 
have concerning object concept. In his words, 
"displacements, even invisible ones, are henceforth 
envisaged as subservient to laws, and objects m  motion 
become real objects independent of the self and 
persisting in their substantial identity* (Piaget,
1954) .
Investigation of Piaget's Findings
Piaget found that infants did not search for 
occluded objects until around nine months of age. Many 
researchers have used Piaget's tasks and modifications 
of these tasks to replicate this finding that young 
infants do not search for hidden objects (see Gratch, 
1976 for review). This is also true of the invisible 
displacement tasks (e.g., Kramer, Hill & Cohen, 1975;
Miller, Cohen St Hill, 1970; Sophian & Sage, 1983; 
Wellman & Somerville, 1982).
The AB tasks are replicable when carried out m  
the same manner as Piaget executed them, but these 
findings are diminished in light of tasks that are 
carried out similarly to Piaget's except for the 
absence of a delay between occlusion and search events 
(Diamond, 1985; Wellman, et al., 1987). In these 
tasks, infants successfully locate the object during 
the B trials even after successive occlusions at the A 
location. This discounts any explanation of the AB 
error in terms of lack of ability to conceptualize the 
location of an occluded object. Instead, it suggests 
that something specific to task demands is leading to 
the error. Evidence has been provided that suggests 
the AB errors are artifacts of his two-choice search 
task (Bjork & Cummings, 1979; Cummings & Bjork, 1981a, 
1981b). These tasks constrain the infant because the 
infant's only option for choosing incorrectly is to 
choose the previous hiding location. That is, what 
Piaget interpreted as failure to understand an object's 
permanence may be a result of the task demands rather 
than some conceptual deficiency. Research that 
supports this view employs tasks similar to Piaget's
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but with five locations rather than two. In these 
tasks, infants do not always choose the previous hiding 
location when making errors, but instead choose one of 
the various locations near the correct hiding place.
New Interpretations of the Qbiect Permanence Data
Although much of Piaget's work is replicable, 
present research suggests new interpretations for his 
findings. The focus in this section of the paper will 
be on these new interpretations of the object 
permanence data; especially, Piaget's claim that 
infants do not begin to endow objects with permanence 
until 9 months ot age.
Investigators speculated that infants may fail 
these tests of an occluded object's existence because 
of the task demands required by manual search. This 
led researchers to develop tests of object permanence 
that did not require manual search as a dependent 
variable. The first of such alternate methodologies to 
be discussed involves searches m  the dark and the 
second, visual tasks.
Bower and Wishart (1972) believe the difficulties 
that infants had in Piaget's search tasks were not due 
to an inability to understand an object's permanence.
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They administered a task that hid an object in a way 
other than covering it. In these studies, a five- 
month-old infant was presented an object in a brightly 
lit room in which they were seated. Once it was 
established that the infant noticed the object and that 
it was within the infant's reach, the room was 
submerged into total darkness before the baby could 
reach out to take the object. Thus the object is “out 
of sight** physically (Bower, 1982); nevertheless, 
infants at this age were shown to reach out and take 
the object as evidenced by infrared recordings. This 
contradicts Piaget's theory since a 5-month-old infant 
reaching in the dark for an object that had been seen 
earlier in the light suggests that the infant 
represented the existence of the object after 
occlusion.
Problems in this experiment have rendered Bower 
andWishart's findings equivocal (Schuberth, 1983), It 
has been suggested that the observed reaching in the 
dark may have been initiated before the lights were 
turned out (Haith & Campos, 1977). The authors argue 
against this by stating that some infants reached out 
for the object even after a wait of 90 seconds. Hie 
problem remains that the reliability is unclear and
that this important variable needs to be meticulously 
controlled.
Another study examining infants' ability to search 
for an object hidden in the dark was done by Hood and 
Willatts (1986) . Using 5-month-olds again, babies were 
presented an object on either their right or left side. 
The object was placed within reaching distance, but the 
babies were restricted from reaching for the object. 
After the room lights were turned off, the infants* 
hands were let free and. again with infrared 
recordings, their reaching responses were measured.
The results showed that infants reached reliably longer 
to the side where they had seen the object presented 
than to the other side.
Converging evidence using a similar paradigm was 
presented by Clifton et al. (1991). The procedure, 
using 6-month-old infants, involved having an infant 
sit on the parent's lap while being held by the hips; 
either a big or small object, attached to the end of a 
rod, was shaken in front of the infant 1.5 meters away 
and then slowly moved forward until within reach. 
Because the object was being shaken while presented to 
the baby, a sound was heard while the object was in the 
baby's presence. Both size objects produced different
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sounds. The sound continued until the baby made 
contact or for 20 seconds. Light and dark trials were 
alternated, and the procedures were identical except 
that the experimenter turned off the lights for the 
dark trials just prior to the beginning of the trial. 
Infrared recordings monitored the results. Infants in 
this study not only reached in the dark for the object 
but also adjusted their arms according to the size of 
the object. This suggests that 6-month-old infants 
represent the existence and size of occluded objects.
One might argue that a problem with this design is 
that the infants may not have been reaching for an 
occluded object but instead may have been reaching 
toward the sound in the dark. This was a valid 
criticism with previous experiments of this kind 
(Perris & Clifton, 1988; Stack et ai., 1989; Wishart et 
al., 1978), but the results of this experiment suggest 
otherwise. Because the infants reached differently for 
the different size objects, they were more likely 
reaching for an obiect and not a sound source. The 
sound source on both size objects was located in the 
center; therefore, the babies would have reached toward 
the center of both objects if they were reaching for a 
sound source. As suggested by Clifton et al. (1991),
the sound seems to serve to “identify the object rather 
than elicit a reach to the spatial location of the 
sound.“
These data suggest that infants do search for 
hidden objects when this search can be done directly as 
opposed to indirectly, as m  Piaget's covering tasks. 
Why is it that infants can successfully perform dark- 
search tasks but not manual search tasks? One 
possibility is that young infants are not able to 
coordinate actions directed at separate objects into 
means-end sequences (Baillargeon, in press; Diamond, 
1988). If this is true, then the babies understand 
that the occluded object continues to exist, but they 
do not understand how to retrieve the object from its 
hiding place. To plan a means-end sequence, the infant 
must act on one object so as to create a condition to 
act on another object. Thus, infants* failure at the 
Piagetian search tasks may be due to an inability to 
produce a means-end sequence of events to retrieve an 
object (e . g ., Diamond, 1988). This is a radically 
different view from a theory that infants do not 
believe the occluded object exists at all.
Some researchers attempted to find other behaviors 
to index the status of the infants' knowledge of
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occluded objects that do not require motor responses at 
all. Bower (1967, 1972, 1974; Bower, Broughton, & 
Moore, 1971) designed several such visual tasks, a few 
which will be discussed here.
Bower et al. (1971) found that 2-month-old infants 
anticipated the reappearance of an object that stopped 
behind a moving screen. Infants were first shown an 
object; a screen then moved m  to hide the object and 
either passed by revealing the object once again, or 
passed by leaving the space empty where the object had 
been. If the infants understood that the occluded 
object continued to exist, they should have been 
surprised by this second event. The results showed 
that the disappearance proved to be much more startling 
to the infants (measured by heart rate responses) than 
the reappearance, suggesting these infants did 
understand object permanence. In another study (Bower, 
1974) 5-month-old infants were shown an object which 
moved at a constant speed along a path. Infants 
tracking this object were surprised by a visual 
transformation of the moving object after it passed 
behind a screen. Bower suggests that this is evidence 
for object permanence because if the infants were not 
surprised by the "disappearance" of the object, they
Infant Cognition
17
would have continued t" track the new object, as if the 
occluded object no It.. \e.r existed.
As with his findings in search-m-the-dark tasks, 
Bower's evidence m  support of young infants' awareness 
of object permanence is equivocal (Schuberth, 1983).
For example, their method of evaluating surprise was 
based on the changes m  heart rate that the infants 
experienced during the trials. However, Huith and 
Campos (1977) noted that it is unclear how heart rate 
responses were determined in Bower's experiments. It 
is also not certain that heart rate vs a good measure 
of surprise in infancy. These results are open to an 
alternative explanation; Piaget accounts for such 
findings by explaining them m  terms of reproduction of 
a previous action, that is, infants may have looked 
back to the screen with the expectation that: this 
action would reproduce the original object. And 
finally, it is not clear that infants were responding 
to the disappearance of the object or simply to a 
change in perceptual display.
Bower's (1974) evidence that 5-month-old infants 
were surprised by a change in the visual properties of 
an object that pursued a trajectory behind a screen is 
also questionable. It is possible that the tracking
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responses m  infants may be the same whether the 
objects features are changed during occlusion or not. 
Bower has been criticized for not employing control 
groups to test for the effects of object transformation 
on tracking behavior (Goldberg, 1976; Gratch, 1975). 
Also, this study, too, can be explained in Piagetian 
terms m  that the infants may have been repeating a 
previous action (looking back toward the screen) in an 
effort to make the hidden object reappear. In summary, 
even with methodological problems aside, Bower’s 
studies .;till are not sufficient to disprove Piaget's 
theory since many of his findings can be explained m  
Piagetian terms.
Baillargeon (1987a; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991; 
Baillargeon & Gardener, 1987; Baillargeon et al., 1985; 
Baillargeon et al., 1990) has developed experiments 
that not only do not rely on manual search tasks, but 
also do not depend on "the extension or reproduction of 
an action or knowledge about superficial properties of 
object disappearances" (Baillargeon et al., 1985). 
Baillargeon et al. (1985) studied object permanence in 
5.5-month-olds using a visual task with the violation- 
of-expectation paradigm described earlier. In this 
experiment, the infants were shown a screen that
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rotated through a 180-degree arc. Once habituated to 
this event, determined by the infant's decrease in 
looking times over the trials, a box was placed m  back 
of the screen. In the possible event, the screen 
rotated back and stopped once it contacted the occluded 
box. After a short pause, it rotated forward to its 
starting position flat on the stage. In the impossible 
event, the screen rotated 180-degrees as though the box 
were no longer there and then rotated forward to expose 
the object again. Baillargeon (1987aJ tested 4.5- 
month-olds with the same paradigm.
Infants m  both age groups looked reliably longer 
at the impossible than the possible event. The longer 
looking time suggests that the infants were surprised 
by the impossible event. A control study using the 
same method but without a box showed that infants 
looked equally at both screen rotations; therefore, the 
longer looking times m  the experimental condition were 
not due to a preference for the longer screen rotation.
These data suggested that the infants (a) 
understood that the box still existed once occluded;
(b) realized that one object (the screen) should not 
simultaneously be able to occupy the space of another 
(the box); and (c) were surprised when this violation
of their expectation occurred. Thus, these studies 
provide evidence that, contrary to Piaget's claims, 
infants as young as 4.5 months old show Knowledge of 
object permanence.
Baillargeon also investigated whether infants 
could represent the existence and location of occluded 
objects (Baillargeon et ai., 1990). 5.5-month-olds 
were familiarized with a toy bear that was occluded by 
a screen and then retrieved from behind the screen by 
an experimenter's hand from a hole on the side of the 
stage. Next, a clear container was either placed over 
the bear or next to the bear and then both objects were 
occluded by the screen. In the impossible event, the 
bear was covered by the clear container, hidden by the 
screen, and then retrieved directly by the 
experimenter's hand. In the possible event, the 
container was placed next to the bear, the screen was 
raised to occlude the objects, and the bear was 
retrieved directly by the experimenter's hand. Thus, 
it was expected that if the infants understood 
existence and location of occluded objects, they would 
be surprised that the bear under the container was 
retrieved since the container covering it was not 
removed first.
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The results showed that the 5 .5-month-old infants 
looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the 
possible event. These findings suggest that the 
infants understood that the objects still existed when 
occluded by the screen, realized that they retained 
their locations, and were therefore surprised when a 
hand retrieved the covered object directly.
It could be argued that the infants may have 
preferred the arrangement of toys in the impossible 
event over the other arrangement, and thus, looked 
longer at these trials, but this possibility was 
controlled by using a pretest trial. These trials 
served to familiarize the baby with the objects by 
showing the two positions of the objects that are used 
during the test trials. The looking times for these 
pretest trials showed that the infants did not prefer 
(i.e. look longer at) one arrangement of objects (bear 
under or beside the cover) over another.
These data provide strong evidence that infants as 
young as 3.5-months of age understand that objects 
continue to exist when occluded. In addition, these 
experiments suggest that infants represent the location 
of occluded objects as well as their existence. All 
this suggests that infants know a lot more about
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objects than Piaget had theorized. But a paradox 
develops when data from another Baillargeon experiment 
is considered (Baillargeon & DeVos, 1992).
This study tested the infants' ability to infer 
the existence of an occluded obiect. Infants aged 6 
and 9 months were presented witft two cloth covers, one 
that lay flat and one that showed a lump. Screens then 
hid the cloths from view. Next, a hand reached m  from 
the side, pulled the cloth out from behind the nearest 
screen, reached behind the screen again and pulled out 
a toy bear. In the impossible event, the flat cloth 
lay nearest to the experimenter and the cloth with the 
lump under it lay behind the farther screen.
Therefore, it would appear surprising to an adult that 
a bear was pulled out from under a flat cloth. The 
possible event reversed the positions of the cloths so 
that the cloth with the lump under it was nearest to 
the experimenter. To control for a possible preference 
of the position of the cloths, the experiment was also 
done with the experimenter's hand entering the stage 
from the opposite side; thus, the positions of the 
cloths for the impossible and possible events were 
opposite than in the original experiment.
The 9-month-old infants looked reliably longer at
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the impossible than at the possible event. This 
suggests that they represented the location of the two 
cloths when occluded and understood that an object 
could not be pulled out from a fiat cloth, and wei^ 
surprised when this happened. The 6-month-olds, 
though, looked equally at the two events suggesting 
they found neither event surprising. In an attempt to 
make the task easier, Baillargeon and DeVos tried a 
similar method using only one screen instead of two. 
Specifically, the 6-month-olds saw either a flat cloth 
(impossible event) or a cloth with a lump (possible 
event) which was then occluded by a screen. A hand 
reached in, pulled out the cloth, and then pulled out a 
bear. The infants still looked equally at the 
impossible and the possible events. Thus, it seems 
these infants believe an object can be pulled out from 
a cloth with a lump or a flat cloth.
This seems inconsistent with findings described 
earlier that infants as young as 3.5-months-old are 
surprised to see a screen rotate in a 180-degree arc 
when a box is placed behind it (Baillargeon, 1987a; 
Baillargeon et al., 1985). In order to understand that 
a bear could not be pulled out from under a flat cloth, 
an infant must understand that objects continue to
Infant Cognition
25
exist when occluded, that they retain their physical 
properties, and that another object cannot 
simultaneously occupy the space of the occluded object. 
Evidence from the rotating screen tasks suggests these 
infants do understand these concepts. Why then do the 
6-month-old infants fail at this task? One important 
difference between the rotating screen and the cloth 
cover tasks exists; in the first task, infants see the 
object initially and then are asked to make predictions 
about it, but m  the second task, the presence of the 
object must be inferred from a lump under a cover.
The next question is why do the rotating screen 
tasks work if infants do not seem to be able to infer 
existence of an object until 9 months? The rotating 
screen task would seem to require both prediction and 
inference since the object is first occluded by the 
screen and then, when the event is done in reverse, 
exposed by the screen. One possible explanation is 
that the infants may not understand the event; that is, 
it may not be clear to the infant an uncovering is 
taking place. But in a comparison of these tasks, a 
flat screen rotating forward to expose an object seems 
to be analogous to a flat cloth producing an object 
from underneath itself. Thus it seems infants are able
to understand such events.
A second possibility is that the effect of the 
condition (looking longer at the impossible than 
possible events) in the rotating screen task was due 
only to longer looking times m  the first, part of the 
impossible event and not the entire event. If this is 
true, then the infants found the occlusion rotation 
(back 180 degrees) surprising but not the disocclusion 
rotation (forward 180 degrees). Thus a separation of 
these two parts of the rotating screen task should 
reveal very different results
Experiment 1 (see Figures 1 and 2) explores this 
separation of the rotating screen data. In the 
occlusion condition, 6-month-old babies were shown an 
object resembling a clown which was then occluded by a 
rotating screen. In the impossible event, the screen 
rotated 180-degrees, passing through the space occupied 
by the clown, until it lay flat on the floor of the 
apparatus. In the possible event, the screen rotated 
112-degrees and stopped so that it did not occupy any 
space of the occluded object. As much of the previous 
data has suggested, it was expected that the infants 
would look reliably longer at the impossible than the 
possible event.
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The second condition of the experiment examined 
the disocciusion event of the rotating screen task; 
starting with the screen fiat (impossible) or at an 
angle consistent with the height of the occluded object 
(possible), the screen rotated forward to expose the 
clown.
We hypothesized that the* disocciusion condition of 
the experiment would fail to show a reliable difference 
in looking times, suggesting to us that infants are 
able to make predictions about known objects months 
before they can postulate about unknown objects.
To examine whether older infants would be 
successful in the disocciusion condition, Experiment 2 
studied 9-month-old infants m  this condition. The 
procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to the 
disocciusion condition of Experiment i except that 9- 
month-old infants were used as subjects.
Finally, Experiment 3 studied whether giving 6- 
month-old infants hints as to the existence of the 
occluded object in the disocciusion condition would 
improve their ability to detect the violation in the 
impossible trials.
Sxperimmnt 1
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Method
Subiacts
Subjects were 24 healthy, full-term infants 
tanging in age from 6 months, 1 days to 7 months, 1 day 
(M- 6,17). Two infants were eliminated due io 
fussiness. The infants' names m  tins experiment aril 
in the following experiments were obtained from birth 
announcements m  the local newspaper. Parents were 
contacted by letters and toilow-up phone calls. They 
were offered reimbursement for their travel expenses 
but were not compensated tor their participation.
Half the infants were assigned to the occlusion 
condition (M - 6,18) and halt to the disocclusion 
condition (M = 6,15). An equal number of males and 
females participated in each condition.
Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of a large wooden box 201 
cm high, 105 cm wide, and 82 cm deep. The infant faced 
an opening m  the front wall of the apparatus 53.5 cm 
high, 100 cm wide and 58 cm deep. The back wall was 
white cardboard and the sides were painted white; the 
floor was covered with light blue cardboard.
In the floor of the apparatus 33 cm from the front and 
26.5 cm from the baby's right side was a hole, 12.5 cm 
wide with a tube that extended down 28 cm under the
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floor of the apparatus. A platform fit in this tube 
and could be raised or lowered by an experimenter's 
hand from under the floor of the apparatus. A 
cardboard segment 18.5 cm wide and 33 cm long, matching 
the color of the floor, was used tc cover the hole 
during non-test trials.
Magnetically attached to the platform was a clown 
figure 21.5 cm high. This figure was made of 
styrofoam, covered in yellow felt, and decorated with 
white cotton hair, push-pin eyes and buttons, a dark 
blue cardboard hat, and a black fabric bow tie.
A light-purple rotating screen with green taped 
edges, 25.5 cm high and 18 cm wide, was taped to the 
floor of the apparatus 3 cm in front of the hole. To 
help the experimenter rotate the screen at the correct 
speed during the trials, a small protractor 3 cm high 
was taped to the floor so that it's center was at the 
base of the screen. This protractor had 45-degree 
intervals marked m  alternating purple and green 
segments. The experimenter moved the screen one 45- 
degree interval each one-second count of the trial. 
Events
Two experimenters worked in unison to produce the 
events; the first rotated the screen and the second
Infant Cognition
29
Infant Cognition
30
raised and lowered the platform. The events were 
broken down into one-second count-. To aid the 
experimenters in the timing of the events, a metronome 
clicked softly at one beat per second.
Occlusion condition. In the occlusion events, the 
infant saw the clown object on the stage. A screen lay 
flat in front of the object. In the impossible trials 
an experimenter’s gloved hand rotates the screen 180- 
degrees thus violating the space where the clown was 
seen to exist. In the possible condition, the screen 
stops at 112-degrees before occupying the space of the 
object.
Impossible and possible test events. At the start 
of the impossible trial, the clown figure stood on the 
raised platform. Once it was determined that the 
infant was attending to the stimuli on the stage, one 
experimenter, wearing a silver glove, began to rotate 
the screen clockwise at a rate of 45-degrees per second 
until a full 180-degree arc was produced. When the 
screen had been rotated 90-degrees, the second 
experimenter lowered the platform from underneath the 
stage. No more movement was made until the computer 
signaled that the trial was over. The possible trial 
was performed the same except the screen only rotated
112,5-degrees, The second experimenter still lowered 
the platform so that any noise made by the platform 
would be constant between trials.
Habituation event. Before the impossible and 
possible test events, the infants saw events identical 
to the test trials described above except that the 
clown tigure was not used and a cardboard segment, 
matching the floor of the apparatus, covered the hole. 
Disocclusion condition. In the disocclusion events, 
the infant saw a screen either fiat on the floor of the 
stage or raised at a 112-degree angle. The screen was 
rotated toward the infant to reveal a clown figure. In 
this condition, a screen starting fiat and revealing a 
clown is the impossible event because the screen should 
not be able to occupy the space where the clown exists. 
In the possible event, the screen starts at an angle 
consistent with the height of the clown and is rotated 
toward the baby to reveal the clown.
Impossible and possible test events. At the start 
of the impossible trial, a screen lay flat on the floor 
of the stage. Once it determined that the infant was 
attending to the stage and screen, the experimenter 
began to rotate the screen counter-clockwise at the 
rate of 45-degrees per second until a full 180-degree
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arc was performed. The second experimenter raised the 
platform with the clown figure attached as the screen 
rotated toward the infant, making sure that the 
platform was completely raised before the screen 
reached 90-degrees. The possible trial was identical 
to the impossible except that the screen began at a 
112.5-degree angle and rotated counter-clockwise from 
there.
Habituation events. As in the forward screen 
rotation condition above, these experiments began with 
habituation trials that were identical to the test 
trials except that no clown figure was used and a 
cardboard cover was placed over the hole.
Procedure
Prior to the experiment, each infant was shown the 
silver glove worn by the experimenter while his or her 
parent filled out consent forms. During the 
experiment, the infant sat on the parent's lap in front 
of the apparatus, facing a large cloth screen that was 
raised and lowered between each trial. The infant's 
head was approximately 58 cm from the screen and 108 cm 
from the back wall of the apparatus. The parent was 
asked not to interact with the infant during the 
experiment and to close his or her eyes during the test
trials so that any reaction he or she might have would 
not influence the child.
The infant's looking behavior was monitored by two 
observers who watched the baby through peepholes m  the 
cloth-covered frames on either side of the apparatus. 
The observers could not see the event from their 
viewpoint and did not know the order in which the 
events were presented. Each observer held a button box 
linked to a MICRO/PDP-11 computer and depressed the 
button when the infant attended to the events. Each 
trial was divided into 100-msec intervals, and the 
computer determined m  each interval whether the two 
observers agreed on the direction of the infant's gaze. 
Interobserver agreement was calculated for each trial 
on the basis of the number of intervals in which the 
computer registered agreement, out of the total number 
of intervals m  the trial. Agreement in this 
experiment and m  the following experiments averaged 
94% or more per trial per infant. The looking times 
recorded by the primary observer were used to determine 
when a trial had ended.
The infants in the occlusion condition 
participated m  a two-phase procedure consisting of a 
habituation phase and a test phase. During the six
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habituation trials, the infant saw the screen rotate 
back to the two different ending positions described 
above on alternate trials. No object, was placed behind 
the screen. The purpose of these trials was (a) to 
familiarize the infant with the screen and its 
rotations and (b) to make it possible to assess whether 
the infants preferred one rotation distance to the 
other. Each trial ended when the infant either looked 
away from the event for 2 cumulative seconds after 
having looked at the event for at least 5 cumulative 
seconds, or looked at the event for 60 cumulative 
seconds without looking away for 2 consecutive seconds. 
During the eight test trials, the infant saw 
alternating impossible and possible events described 
above. The criteria used to determine the end of each 
trial were the same as for the habituation trials. The 
five second minimum value was chosen to ensure enough 
time elapsed to allow an entire impossible or possible 
event to occur. Half the infants saw the habituation 
trials and test trials with the 180-degree rotation 
test event first, and half with the habituation trials 
and the 112.5-degree rotation test event first.
The infants in the disocclusion condition also 
participated in a two-phase procedure consisting of a
habituation phase and a test phase. During the 
habituation trials, the infant saw the screen rotate 
forward from the two different starting positions 
described above. No object was placed behind the 
screen. These habituation trials were used for the 
reasons stated tor the previous condition. The eight 
test trials consisted of alternating impossible and 
possible events described above. Half the infants saw 
the impossible event first, and halt the possible event 
first. The criteria used to determine when the trials 
ended were identical to that of the occluding 
condition.
Results
Analysis of infants looking times to the 
habituation events indicated that the infants looked 
reliably less across pairs of events, F(2,66) = 4.43, p 
< .02. There were no otner significant effects, 
suggesting that the infants nad no preference for 
either of the screen rotations.
The infants' looking times at the test events are 
presented in Figure 3. Analysis of infants' looking 
times at the test events revealed a significant 
interaction between Condition (occlusion versus 
disocclusion) and Event (impossible versus possible),
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F( 1,110) ~ 3.86, p < 02. Planned contrasts revealed
that the infants in the occlusion condition looKed 
reliably longer at the impossible event 'M - 12.7 si 
than at the possible event (M - 8.7 si, Ft 1,110) -
6.26, p - .01, whereas the infants in the disocciusion
condition looked equally at: the two events (impossible 
event, M = 15.1 s ,* possible event, M = 15.5 s, F (1, 110 j 
 ^ 0.08] .
Discussion
These results suggest that the infants were 
surprised when the screen appeared to pass through the 
space where the clown was seen to exist, but not 
surprised to see the clown appear from beneath the flat 
screen.
One possible explanation for these results is that 
the infants1 performance in the tasks depended on their 
initial representation of the events. According to 
this view, to succeed in the occlusion condition the 
infants must initially represent the clown in the space 
behind the screen; then they must express surprise when 
the screen rotates through the space as if it were 
empty. To succeed in the disocciusion condition the 
infants must initially represent the position of the 
screen, and then express surprise when the clown
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appears in the space that the screen previously 
occupied. Thus, it could be that the infants in the 
disocclusion condition did not detect the violation of 
the space because they failed to represent the initial 
screen position and the space beneath it.
This led to two further experiments: Experiment 2
investigated whether older infants would be able to 
reason successfully about these disocclusion events. 
Experiment 3 investigated whether we could locus the 
attention of 6.5-month-oid infants on the initial 
position of the screen and the space beneath it 
allowing them to reason successfully about the 
disocclusion violation.
Experiment 2 
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 12 healthy, full-term infants 
ranging m  age from 9 months, 0 days to 9 months, 14 
days (M * 9,6). Four infants were eliminated, two due 
to fussiness and two due to experimenter error. 
Apparatus
The apparatus was identical to the apparatus in 
Experiment 1.
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Events
The events were identical to those in the 
disoeelusloa condition of Experiment 1,
Procedure
The procedure was identical to thut of Experiment
1.
Results and Discussion
The infants* looking times at the test events are 
presented in Figure 4. Analyses of the infants' 
looking times to the test events revealed no reliable
differences,
The infants looked equally at the possible event 
(M * 13.5 s) and the impossible event (M - 13.3 s),
F (1,33) « 0.01.
These results suggest that the infants were not 
surprised to see the clown appear from beneath a fiat 
screen. Again, a possible explanation for this result 
is that the infants failed to represent that the screen 
initially lay flat in the impossible event.
BxperiNat 3
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to lead infants to 
reason about the initial position of the screen and the 
space beneath the screen, allowing them to succeed in 
detecting the violation in the impossible disocclusion 
event. Infants were assigned to either the support or
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non-support condition which differed only in the 
familiarization displays* In the support condition, 
infants were presented with a display in which a 
rotating screen stood at 112-degrees and an identical 
screen lay flat beside it. In the non-support 
condition, infants were presented with a display m  
which two identical screens lay flat on the floor of 
the apparatus rotated towards the infant < see Figure 
5). After viewing the familiarization display, infants 
in both conditions were presented with the test events 
from the disoeclusion condition m  Experiment 1.
The prediction was that the infants m  the support 
condition would be led to reason about the initial 
position of the screen and tne space behind it for two 
reasons: la) the infants would be led to believe that 
the screen which stood at 112-degrees with no visible 
source of support must have an object supporting it 
from behind and lb) the infants would be led to compare 
the two initial screen positions 1112-degrees and 
180-degrees).
We further predicted that the non-support 
condition would not focus the infants' attention on the 
initial screen position and the space behind the screen 
in that in this condition, both of the screens were
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flat and in the same orientation.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 17 healthy, full-term infants 
ranging in age from 6 months, 1 day to 7 months, 5 days 
(M a 6,15). One infant was eliminated due to 
fussiness.
Apparatus
The apparatus was identical to the apparatus in 
Experiment 1.
Events
In the support condition, infants were presented 
with a familiarization display in which a rotating 
screen stood at 112-degrees and an identical screen lay 
fiat beside it. In the noil-support condition, infants 
were presented with a display in which two identical 
screens lay flat on the floor of the apparatus rotated 
towards the infant. In both conditions the test events 
were identical to the test event m  the disocciusion 
condition in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to the procedure of 
Experiment 2 with two exceptions: (1) there w^re no 
habituation trials and (2) two familiarization trials
Infant Cognition
40
immediately preceded the test trials.
Results
The infants looking times at the test events are 
presented in Figure 6. As predicted, analyses of the 
infants' looking in the support condition revealed a 
significant effect of Event. F(l,29) - 8.44, p < .01 
(impossible event, M = 18,6 s; possible event, M * 13.0 
si. However, contrary to our prediction, the infants 
in the non-support condition aiso looked reliably 
longer at the impossible event ■M - 20.6 s) than the 
possible event (M - 15.*? s > . F(1 29) ~ 5.96, p < .03.
Discussion
It appears that presenting the infants with either 
of the familiarization displays prior to the test 
events allowed them to detect the violation. A 
possible explanation for why the familiarization 
displays facilitated their reasoning has to do with the 
infants* initial representations of the events. We 
believe that the two familiarization displays affected 
infants' representations in different manners. As 
previously stated, in the support condition, it could 
have been that the infants were led to reason about the 
initial position of the screen and the space behind it 
for two reasons (a) because the screen at 112-degrees
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had no visible source of support, and thus it appeared 
as though an object must have been supporting it from 
behind and (b) because the infants were given the 
opportunity to compare the two initial screen 
positions.
In the non-support condition it could have been 
that the infants were led to reason about the space 
behind the screen because this space was initially 
visible (unlike the other disocciusion conditions, m  
which the space behind the screen was only revealed at 
the end of the event). Perhaps because the space was 
initially visible the infants were more likely to 
represent it and detect a violation which occurred m  
it.
General Discussion
In Experiment 1. 6.5-month-old infants in the 
occlusion condition were surprised by an event m  which 
a rotating screen appeared to pass through the space 
where a toy clown was seen to exist, but not surprised 
in the disocciusion condition by an event in which the 
clown appeared from beneath the flat screen. In 
Experiment 2, 9.5-month-old infants were also nr|j 
surprised by the violation m  the disocciusion 
condition. One possible explanation for these results
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is that the infants' initial representations of the 
disocclusion events did not allow them to detect the 
violation. This suggests that infants are able to make 
predictions about known objects months before they can 
postulate and reason about unknown objects.
This intuitively makes sense when one considers 
what is required for an infant to make predictions 
about known objects and what skills are needed to make 
inferences about unknown objects. Having seen an 
objecti infants can predict many things about this 
object. As young as 3.5 months, they seem to 
understand that the object continues to exist once 
occluded; evidence has also suggested that infants this 
age represent properties of these occluded objects; and 
finally, infants as young as 5.5 months represent the 
location of hidden objects.
For infants to posit about an unknown object, 
though, they would first have to assume the presence of 
the object. It is possible that infants less than 9 
months of age do not spontaneously infer the existence 
of an unknown, occluded object unless they have prior 
experience with the object or are led by other cues to 
infer the existence.
In Experiment 3 we attempted to give the infants
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cues to manipulate their initial representations of the 
test events. We found two ways of focusing infants' 
attention on the initial screen position and the space 
behind it One involved simply allowing them to 
initially view the space behind the screen and tf. 
other involved leading them to believe that an object 
was supporting the screen from behind. Both of these 
manipulations led to successful performance m  the 
disocciusion condition. The results of these 
experiments suggest that the way infants initially 
construe events strongly influences their future 
reasoning about these events.
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Figure 1. Schematic drawing of the habituation and
test events shown to the infants in the Occlusion 
Condition of Experiment 1
Figure 2. Schematic drawing of the habituation and 
test events shown to the infants in the Disocclusion 
Condition of Experiment 1.
Figure 3, Mean looking times of the infants in 
Experiment 1 at the possible ana impossible test 
events.
Figure Captions
Figure 4. Kean looking times of the infants in 
Experiment 2 at the possible and impossible test 
events.
Figure 5. Schematic drawing of the familiarisation 
displays shown to the infants in Experiment 3.
Figure 6. Kean looking times of the infants in 
Experiment 3 at the possible and impossible test
events.
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